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PART FOUR: CHALLENGES BY COMPETITORS AND
GOVERNMENTS IN RESPONSE TO FOREIGN SUBSIDIES,
DUMPING AND IMPORT SURGES
MODERATOR: MICHAEL W. GORDON*
PANEL MEMBERS:
HARVEY APPLEBAUM,**
GABRIEL CASTAF4EDA GALLARDO,***
TERENCE P. STEWART,****
JOHN GERO*****

THE PROBLEM
Using the same facts as the previous hypothetical problems, consider
the following: Several more years have passed. GROWFAST and AGRICOLAS have a large share of the market in Mexico. A Mexican competitor, INSECTICIDA DE JALISCO, S.A. de C.V., has discovered that
GROWFAST sells Sollatem in Mexico for what appears to be about
twenty percent less than the price in the United States home market. It
also believes that GROWFAST receives major tax breaks from the state
of Kansas and the city of Topeka and receives farm supports from the
Unites States federal government. INSECTICIDA would like the Mexican
government to investigate GROWFAST.
Michael Gordon: If the successful sales in Mexico by GROWFAST
are attributable to the tax breaks given to them by Kansas or the farm
supports by the United States federal government, is there any action
that Insecticida or the Mexican government might take to protect Mexican
producers from such competition?
THE DISCUSSION
Gabriel Castafleda: In principle, there could be an action under the
Mexican Foreign Trade Law.' INSECTICIDA or the Mexican government
could use the Mexican Foreign Trade Law mechanisms if there has been
an improper subsidy or if there is a major differ ence in prices between
the two comparable markets.
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Michael Gordon: Do you distinguish between export subsidies and
domestic subsidies? It does not seem terribly clear to me that the Kansas
tax breaks are given only for companies doing exports.
Castafieda: Mexican law, which has a very broad definition 2 of "subvenci6nes" (subsidies), could encompass that specific concept.
Gordon: What about the U.S. law and the Canadian law, would these
be actionable subsidies?
Terence Stewart: The answer to the question whether it makes a
difference if the subsidies are for export or domestic sale depends on
whether they are perceived to be, per se, specific under both the World
Trade Organization (WTO) agreement3 and U.S. law, 4 and by reference,
Canadian' and Mexican law. 6 Export subsidies are actionable if they are
above de minimis amounts and if there is injury. Domestic subsidies are
actionable only if other tests are satisfied, the most important of which
is whether they will be viewed as limited in their nature. A tax break
is the type of subsidy that could go either way depending on whether
the government has wide discretion in granting it, whether it is broadly
available, and whether it is available to a few sectors or industries. If
the subsidy is limited, it would be viewed as specific and hence potentially
actionable. If the subsidy is something that is given to all agricultural
or manufacturing products, it would not be an obvious subsidy.
In the fact situation given here, there may be as many as four causes
of action. One is for dumping where there is a 20076 differential in price.
While that 2007o differential in price might be justified by differences in
what are called direct selling expenses or differences in levels of trade,
a 2007o price difference in many products is more than sufficient to cause
both harm in the market and a finding of dumping.
You hypothesize that the company is "in danger" - there are a lot
of facts not stated, such as whether this is the only company that produces
this product. If it is the only producer, then you have an injured industry.
Under dumping methodology in all three countries, you must have an
industry that is harmed, not just a single company.
If there is a rapid increase in imports, it is possible that you might
also have a safeguard action. In the United States or any of the other

2. Id. Art. 28. "La subvencion es el beneficio quo otorga un govierno extranjero, sus organismos
pfiblicos o mixtos, o sus entidades directa o indirectamente, a los productores, transformadores,
comerzializadores o exportadores de mercancias, para fortalecer inequitativamente su posici6n competetiva internacional, salvo que se trata de pricticas internacionalmente aceptadas ..
"
3. Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, GATT Doc. MTN/FA 1I-A (Dec.
15, 1993) [hereinafter WTO Agreement], in GATT Secretariat, Final Act Establishing the Results
of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (April 15, 1994), reprinted in 33 I.L.M.
1143 [hereinafter Final Act]; implemented by U.S. Congress in Uruguay Round Agreements Act,
Pub. L. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (Dec. 8, 1994), 19 U.S.C.A. § 3501 (West Supp. 1996) [hereinafter
URAA].
4. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5) (1994) (countervailable subsidy).
5. Special Import Measures Act, R.S.C., ch. S-15 (1985), amended by S.C., ch. 65, § 26(1)
(1988) (Can.); Canadian International Trade Tribunal Act, R.S.C. 1985, ch. 47 (4th Supp. 1988),
as amended. See also Act to Implement the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
S.C. 1994, ch. 47, §§ 144-189 (Can.).
6. Foreign Trade Law, supra note 1.
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countries, since you are dealing with a pesticide, there would also be
some possibility of satisfying health and safety standards that may exist
at both the state and federal levels. This might be the basis for a cause
of action to restrict imports at the border or to have them banned
altogether.
Gordon: In the subsidy law, I believe that the WTO agreement has
adopted three categories: export subsidies which are, per se, unlawful;
domestic subsidies 7which are actionable; and domestic subsidies which
are non-actionable.
Stewart: That is true. The "greenlight" subsidies8 are non- actionable.
If the tax breaks were subsidies for research prior to actual development,
and if they were limited in amount, they might satisfy the greenlight
exception.
If the tax breaks or other subsidies were for disadvantaged regions
and fit certain criteria, you might also have a greenlight exception. If
they constituted one-time breaks to improve environmental conditions,
did not support operating expenses, or were limited in amount, they
might also be greenlight subsidies. Some greenlight subsidies under the
WTO have now been implemented into U.S. law. 9
Harvey Applebaum: We have been proceeding on the assumption that
GROWFAST is the only U.S. producer of this particular orchid pesticide,
Sollate TM. It would become very important in analyzing a possible antidumping or countervailing duty action to know whether there is a "like
product," (that is the relevant market term in the trade laws).' 0 It is
necessary to determine whether your case is limited to this particular
pesticide or whether there are, "like products," i.e., whether the relevant
market is broader. Let us assume that SollateTM is a monopolist in the
United States and is the only U.S. producer. That does not in any way
foreclose an anti-dumping or countervailing duty action. As a matter of
fact, we have had many successful anti-dumping petitions by either total
monopolists in the U.S. market or companies that were dominant in the
product. If you are going to consider an action in the United States,
you have to know who the potential petitioners are and whether it is
one company or many. A successful claim must satisfy the requirement
of "material injury" to a domestic industry." These facts suggest a
possible actionable subsidy and a dumping situation. You have to analyze
what the product is, who the petitioners are, whether there are several
producers or one, and whether you can show injury. In these cases,
arguments have been made that, by definition, a monopolist does not
suffer injury within the meaning of the anti-dumping and countervailing
duty laws. These arguments have been rejected.

7.
8.
9.
10.
Act of
11.

Final Act, supra note 3.
19 U.S.C. § 1677(5B)(A)-(D) (1994).
URAA, supra note 3.
The terms "domestic like product" and "foreign like product" are defined in the Tariff
1930. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1677(10), (16) (1994), as amended by the URAA, supra note 3.
19 U.S.C. §§ 1671-77 (1994).
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John Gero: I think Mr. Stewart's analysis is correct and applies to
Canada as well. I would like to touch on two other matters. One, if it
is an industrial product and there is clearly an export subsidy, then there
is one other basis for a claim: that the subsidy is prohibited under the
WTO agreements. In fact, a Canadian producer could go to the Canadian
government and say, "Look, what the United States is doing is illegal
under their WTO obligations." The Canadian government could seek a
review by a WTO panel and an order to get those subsidies removed.
Second, the way Canada and the United States implement laws and
the way Mexico implements its international obligations is somewhat
different. In Canada and the United States, international obligations only
apply to domestic law to the extent they have been implemented by
domestic statutes. 2 Both Canada and the United States have adopted
implementing legislation for the WTO.' 3 In the Mexican context, international treaties are self-executing. Mexico has not, as yet, formally
amended its Foreign Trade Law to reflect the changes that have been
entered into in the context of the implementation of the Uruguay Round.
Because the WTO Agreement is an international treaty, the text of WTO
subsidies and anti-dumping codes have the full force of law in Mexico.
If a party wishes to bring an anti-dumping or countervailing duty case
in Mexico, it needs to do two things. It needs to look at the Foreign
Trade Law in Mexico, as well as the anti-dumping and subsidy provisions
from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade which are incorporated
in the WTO Agreement. 4 There is not necessarily consistency between
those two instruments at the present time, and, under Mexican law, it
is the WTO agreements that would govern.
Gordon: For example, the Mexican Foreign Trade Law simply says
"injury' ' 1 5 and the WTO says "material injury,"'16 so is the Mexican
Secretaria de Comercio y Fomento Industrial (SECOFI) following the
material injury test?
Castafieda: The WTO Agreement is the law in Mexico for all legal,
practical purposes, so it should override whatever deficiencies the Foreign
Trade Law has.
Stewart: The Mexican trade law was put on the books after Mexico
became a member of the GATT in 1988, and the GATT material injury

12. Although generally true, some international obligations under U.S. law are "self-executing"
such as extradition treaties, and do not require implementing legislation.
13. Act to Implement the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, supra note 5;
URAA, supra note 3.
14. Foreign Trade Law, supra note 1; Art. VI, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct.
30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 187; Agreement on Implementation of Art. VI of GATT, Apr. 12, 1979,
31 U.S.T. 4919, 18 I.L.M. 621; Office of U.S. Trade Representative, Final Act, Decisions and
Declarations Relating to Agreement on Implementation of Art. VI, 401 (1994). For detailed discussion,
see Criag R. Giesze, Mexico's New Antidumping and Countervailing Duty System: Policy and Legal
Implications, as Well as PracticalBusiness Risks and Realities, for United States Exporters to Mexico
in the Era of the North American Free Trade Agreement, 25 ST. MARy's L.J. 885 (1994).
15. Foreign Trade Law, supra note 1, art. 39.
16. GATT material injury test: WTO Agreement, supra note 3, at art. 15 (determination of
injury).
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test is the test used to hold accountable those people who are citizens
of states which are members of the GATT.17 One of the interesting
scenarios concerning dumping law history in Mexico is that the largest
set of dumping cases were brought against imports from China. Presently,
China is not a member of the GATT, so the obligations of the GATT
and the new WTO are not applicable in the United States or in most
other countries unless there is a bilateral treaty with China on the particular
issue. Mexican law was modified as a result of NAFTA but before then
had some provisions which were not imposed vis-a-vis the United States.
One provision of the Mexican trade law permitted a preliminary decision
of SECOFI to become effective within five days. This provision was, in
fact, used against China. Supplemental tariffs ranging from approximately
300o%0 up to 1100%0 were imposed within five days of the announced
initiation of cases, covering 2576 of all Chinese imports into Mexico. It
8
was as close to an economic act of war as imaginable.
Gordon: The government agencies that deal with these issues differ in
each country. The International Trade Administration (ITA) is part of
the Department of Commerce and deals with the determination of whether
subsidies exist and whether there is dumping, or sales at less than fair
value.' 9 The International Trade Commission (ITC), a quasi-independent
agency, makes the injury determination. Why is that? Does it make sense?
Could one agency do the job? In Mexico, one agency does both tasks.
Applebaum: The United States did at one time have one agency making
both dumping and subsidy determinations and the injury determination.
That was the Treasury Department. Congress was unhappy with the
Treasury Department's implementation of the statute, and in 1954, the
injury determination was taken away and given to the then Tariff Commission, the agency that has since become the International Trade Commission. 20 At one time, the Treasury Department was directed to conduct
preliminary injury reviews before going forward with a case. Later,
Congress, disappointed with the Treasury Department's enforcement of
the law, shifted responsibility for dumping and subsidy determinations
from Treasury to Commerce. There has been little consideration of recombining the two functions again into one agency.
These responsibilities were clarified by the 1974 amendments to the
antidumping law. 2 ' There have been occasional calls to shift all functions
to Commerce or all to the ITC. Even today, as part of the Congressional
momentum for dismantling or changing the Commerce Department there
has been considerable debate over where the trade law functions of the

17. Id.
18. Dumping Cases Against Imports from China, see S. CmNA MomINo POST, June 30, 1993,
at 3, May 18, 1993, at 3; J. OF COM., May 14, 1993 at Al; Fm. Timss, April 28, 1993, at 7.
19. Commerce Dep't Organization Order No. 10-3, 45 Fed. Reg. 6141 (Jan. 25, 1980).
20. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. 93-618, §§ 171-175 (1974) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2231(a)
(1994)).
21. For the responsibilities of the U.S. Dep't of Commerce International Trade Administration
(the "administering authority") in connection with the administration of the countervailing and
antidumping laws, see Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671-16771 (1994).
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Commerce Department-determination of the existence of dumping and
subsidies-should go if the Commerce Department were abolished. Possible agencies include the ITC, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative,
or a new, independent Department of Trade.
The International Trade Administration (ITA) is part of the Department
of Commerce, which is an executive agency reporting to the President.
The International Trade Commission is a quasi-independent agency composed of six commissioners appointed by the President; no more than
three can be from either party, and the chairman rotates every two years.
The ITC should probably not be viewed as entirely independent of the
political process. It is not bound by the Administrative Procedure Act,
nor is it required to provide full due process rights to parties before it.
The Commerce and ITC decisions are subject to two levels of judicial
review, based on substantial evidence on the record. One level is the
Court of International Trade and the other is the United States Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
Stewart: The direction internationally has been towards what could be
called the U.S.-Canadian bifurcated approach.2 2 The justification in part
was a concern that the Treasury Department was not distinguishing
determinations of existence of dumping from determinations of injury.
If they decided there was a serious injury case, they might have found
dumping whether the facts were strong in support of dumping or not,
and vice versa. Dividing the process provided for an independent examination of the extent to which an industry was harmed, regardless of
whether or not dumping or subsidization was occurring. Canada has a
similar bifurcated approach. Australia and the European Union, the other
historic major users, have had unitary approaches. The European Union
is in the process of changing to a bifurcated approach, but within a
single entity. Different departments of the same agency will be responsible
for the two stages. There seems to be a movement towards a bifurcated
approach for the purpose of obtaining an independent evaluation of the
injury. This procedure creates hurdles and is probably not as cost-efficient
as a proceeding before a single agency, but it provides certain safeguards
when making the determinations.
Gero: Canada has a bifurcated system similar to that of the United
States. The Canadian Department of Commerce makes the countervailing
duty or anti-dumping duty findings and the Canadian International Trade
Tribunal (CITT), conducts the injury determination.
Gordon: How are Mexico's dumping and subsidy determinations made?
Castafleda: There has always been a single entity in Mexico, although
the 1993 Foreign Trade Law creates a second stage for review by a
Foreign Trade Commission. 23 However, the Commission which conducts
the second stage has no real teeth; it can only render non-binding opinions.

22. See Special Import Measures Act; Canadian International Trade Tribunal Act, supra note
5.
23. Foreign Trade Law, supra note 1, arts. 2-5.
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The crux of the matter is that SECOFI has the power to assess the
existence of dumping and subsidies and to declare injury. Anti-dumping
involves a great amount of politics. In my view, Mexico needs to tackle
more basic things before it adopts a more developed bifurcated system.
Mexico has quite a lot to learn from Canada and the U.S. and other
countries about how to defend itself in foreign trade related matters.
Gordon: Is there an internal division within SECOFI regarding who
deals with the determination of dumping and subsidies and who deals
with injury?
Castafieda: In the case of the unit which handles anti-dumping in
Mexico, there is a real effort by SECOFI to create a large enough entity;
they have over 200 people now.
Applebaum: I mentioned that in the U.S., ITC and Commerce decisions
are subject to two levels of judicial review. I want to remind everyone
that is not true of the proceedings under NAFTA. 24 Cases between the
three countries may go to the Article 19 bi-national panels. However, I
would like to know what kind of judicial review is available in Mexico,
if any, to challenge a SECOFI decision in a case which does not involve
a NAFTA country.
Castarleda: SECOFI's decisions are subject to judicial review. For
example, if a SECOFI decision were based on information which was
to seek
not disclosed to the losing party, that party would be entitled
25
relief in a direct amparo proceeding before a federal judge.
Gordon: I think most people aren't familiar with the various types of
action. They would like some action brought to help save their market
share. I have read that there are only two possible remedies under Mexican
trade law, anti-dumping and subsidy remedies. However, the WTO Agreement is law in Mexico and it covers the safeguard remedy where excessive
imports threaten to injure a domestic industry. Is the safeguard remedy
available for SECOFI under Mexican law?
Castafieda: I would say that the answer is "no."
Stewart: The WTO does not require that a member country have a
safeguard provision in its trade laws, just as it doesn't require the country
to have a countervailing duty law or a dumping law. So I think there
would be that distinction in terms of whether there is a remedy.
Gordon: There are concerns that the methodology within SECOFI is
not as fact-specific in proving subsidies and dumping as in the United
States and Canada. Is that correct in your perception?
Stewart: I think SECOFI is in the same stage of development where
the Canadian, U.S. and European systems were quite a few years ago.
Most countries with dumping laws start by administering those laws

24. See Chapter 19 of the North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992 U.S.-Can.Mex. (effective Jan. 1, 1994), 32 I.L.M. 289, 682 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
25. The amparo suit is a Mexican legal institution similar in its effects to such Anglo-American
procedures as habeas corpus, error and other forms of injunctive relief. For a thorough and well
documented study of an amparo in English, see RicmARD D. BAKER, JUDIcIAL REVIW IN MAXICO,
A STUDY OF THE "A PARO" SurT (1971).
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through their ministry of finance or treasury department because that is
usually where they have customs houses administering the tariffs. It is
an evolutionary kind of process. Mexico has had to go through a very
rapid learning curve because of NAFTA. In my experience, there is a
fair amount of specificity in their calculations. They do not have the
bureaucracy, even though 200 people is a lot of people, to review cases
with the same amount of transparency and due process as in the United
States, but in fact their transparency and due process are superior to
that of Canada at Revenue Canada, which is basically a black box on
the dumping side. That is similar to how the Europeans run their system.
In Mexico you have a protective order system quite similar to that of
the United States, so that at least each party can gain access to the
information that is submitted by the other. This improves the opportunity
of having a realistic outcome: such an opportunity is not available in
either Canada or Europe.
Gero: I'm not sure that is correct; certainly not regarding Canada.
What is clear is that we have agreed in NAFTA on a procedure that in
essence will force all administrative agencies involved in these determinations to be able to prove that they have implemented consistently the
laws of the land.
Castafieda: Chapter 19 of NAFTA really forces Mexico into a higher
bracket of enforcement, clarity and specificity of regulations and criteria
and standards. My only worry is the backlog. In the Steel Case, the
Secretaria de Comercio y Fomento Industrial (SECOFI) procedures were
perhaps not as detailed and as careful as they should have been. 26 Mexico
is learning the hard way. I expect that to change, not just the quality
of the rules but also the way they are enforced.
Applebaum: There are two issues that are coming together on the
Chapter 19 bi-national panels. These panels are supposed to apply the
law of the country in which the proceeding takes place, similar to what
the judicial system of that country would do. When compared to the
information that can be obtained from the U.S. Commerce Department,
it is not easy to obtain from Revenue Canada the basis of a dumping
determination. A bi-national panel applying Canadian law would thus
not necessarily be in the position hypothetically to determine that the
transparency required by the WTO Anti-dumping code was satisfied. If
a party seeking to appeal to a bi-national panel wishes to challenge, not
the decision of the agency as such under substantive U.S., Canadian or
Mexican law, but contends that the proceeding was inconsistent with the
WTO obligations of the country in question (and all three countries are
members of the WTO), is that a bi-national panel issue, or must the
aggrieved party or government pursue that with the WTO in Geneva?
This has been widely discussed but not resolved. Do the bi-national panels

26. Binational panels ruled 3-2 that SECOFI had acted outside of its jurisdiction in imposing
duties of 760o against USX Corp. And 76% against Bethlehem Steel Corp. BNA, Int. Trade Rep.
1480 (Sept. 6, 1995)
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under NAFTA have the jurisdiction to deal with obligations of a member
country under the WTO Agreement?
Gero: The answer is "no." There are two dispute settlement processes,
two distinct processes. Unfortunately they get confused, but they are very
distinct and their objectives are different. Whether a country has met
its international obligations would have to be referred to a WTO panel
which would decide whether Canadian law conforms with its obligations
under the WTO Agreement. There is a similar provision in Chapter 20
of NAFTA regarding whether a member is living up to its obligations
under NAFTA. But it must be recognized that there are no substantive
anti-dumping and subsidy obligations in NAFTA. The only international
the three countries
obliga tions relating to dumping and subsidies that
27
have are in the context of the WTO Agreement.
The Chapter 19 process is totally different. It is designed to address
the issue whether the administrative agencies of the three member countries
have applied their own law consistently. It is possible to have these
processes run parallel. The Canadian Softwood Lumber Case provides
an example.3 The United States government self-initiated the case and
went through a normal countervailing duty process which the Canadian
parties challenged under Chapter 19 of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement. 29 The issue was whether the U.S. administrative agencies carried
out their functions consistently with U.S. law. At the same time, Canada
took the United States government to the GATT to decide whether the
action of the U.S. government was consistent with U.S. obligations under
the GATT. Hence, it is possible to run parallel processes because the
two processes are intended to examine two different issues.
Gordon: What about the appeal process from NAFTA panel decisions?
Applebaum: There is a growing sentiment in the U.S. Congress that
the bi-national panels are undesirable. For example, there was a letter
that Senator Dole and many other congressmen signed urging the United
States to abstain from entering into any agreement with Chile to utilize
the binational panels.3 0 Their position was that the bi-national panel

process was supposed to be only a temporary measure. Most of the
criticism of the panels is coming from U.S. industries unhappy with the
results the panels gave them. The most vocal critics of the panels claim
that the panels have gone beyond their mandate of deciding whether the
administrative agencies made decisions consistent with the law of their
country. If a claim is brought in an anti-dumping case in any of these
three countries against imports from one of the other three countries,
an appeal from the final administrative determination can be made to

27. WTO Agreement. supra note 3.
28. In re Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, No. ECC-94-1904 OOUSA (U.S.Can. FTA Panel) (Aug. 3, 1994).
29. Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 12, 1987 and Jan. 2, 1988, ch. 19 arts.
1901, 1904, Annexes 1901.2, 1904.13, 27 I.L.M. 281, 386-390, 393-395 (1988) [hereinafter FTA].
30. BNA, Int. Trade Rep. 1410 (Aug. 23, 1995).
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a bi-national panel, or to a panel established under the WTO for failure
to comply with international obligations under the WTO Agreement.',
Stewart: There is actually another option. A party may appeal to a
national court, although I do not believe this option has ever been
exercised. This option requires that the other party not oppose the appeal
within the 30-day period provided for requesting a binational panel review.
From the cases that have gone forward, most people involved generally
have found the panels to be a reasonable approach to dispute resolution,
with some notable exceptions. 3 2 Those people who serve as panelists by
and large have very limited, if any, understanding of the foreign legal
system involved. Canada's roster, for example, historically has been
comprised mostly of non-lawyers. Thus, non-lawyers from a foreign
country attempt to construe how a U.S. court would construe U.S. law.
One has to wonder, even if the system is working reasonably well, whether
there is any logic in putting people to that kind of a test. Another
problem concerns the number of lawyers involved in trade matters and
the appearance of conflict. I believe it is a bigger problem in Canada
and Mexico than in the United States. In Canada most of the major
trade lawyers are in large firms and those large firms over time have
represented the provinces or the Canadian government on one or more
trade matters. This creates a fairly easy hunting ground for those looking
for possible conflicts. That same issue has now spread to the WTO,
where the United States is seeking stronger conflict provisions. Whether
the binational panel process is considered good or bad, the panels in the
vast majority of cases have resolved disputes more quickly than the
courts. 33 That is becoming less true today than before, however.
There are some fairly legitimate concerns people raise. People who
lose question the fairness of the process. Since panel decisions are theoretically not binding, one of the problems with expanding the binational
panel process is the possibility of creating independent bodies of law
dealing with the same statute in each participating country. Dumping
law could mean different things for Canadian imports than for Mexican
imports, or Japanese imports from those in the United States. There is
a range of those issues that have not been sorted out. One of the
justifications for the binational panel is that it represents a political
compromise. From Canada's perspective, there was a concern that the
U.S. court review process was both too long and too political.
Gordon: Members of the binational panels from the United States have
been largely attorneys, including professors, practitioners, and judges.

31. NAFrA, supra note 24, ch. 19.
32. One case challenged the constitutionality of the system: Coalition for Fair Lumber Imports
v. Unites States, No. 94-1627 (D.C. Cir., docketed Oct. 4, 1994, withdrawn by voluntary motion
to dismiss Jan. 5, 1995). See also JAmEs R. CANNON, RESOLVING DISPUTES UNDER NAFTA CHAPTER
19, ch. 16 (1994) (constitutionality of Chapter 19 panel process).
33. For a thorough discussion of the dispute resolution system under NAFTA Chapter 19, as
well as the controversies that served as the impetus for binational panel review, see id. at ch. 11
(origins of panel procedures).
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Some have asserted the idea of placing more retired judges on the panels
to make them more like the courts. What do you think of that?
Stewart: If there are any judges on the roster, they must be recent
appointees. The original list was largely a who's who of the trade bar.
One of the concerns that did not play out in terms of the voting patterns
was that in this area of law it is difficult to imagine how any trade
lawyer could be a panelist. Trade lawyers, almost by definition, are
conflicted out because the issues are going to be the issues that are
relevant to their clients.
Gordon: Licenciado Castafieda, what have been the issues concerning
appointees from Mexico? Who have they been?
Castafieda: I was offered the opportunity to be on the Mexican roster
but I refused. My reason was that the process is too complex, and it
is subject to great political pressure.
The roster should be very well equipped with lawyers. I think the Steel
case has taught Mexico a lesson. I think 85% of the problem was that
SECOFI's procedures were not sufficiently transparent and were not
conducted with sufficient care. The department of SECOFI which conducts
the administrative proceedings should be staffed with lawyers, specifically
lawyers who understand the economics and practical implications of the
process. That will take time to develop.
Gero: It should not be surprising that Canada has strong views on
this important aspect of both the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement
and NAFTA. The administration in the United States has pushed very
hard to get judges onto the panels. It is unclear to me that this is
necessary, but in any event, in the latest set of rosters, the Canadians
have appointed more judges to the rosters than the Americans. Perhaps,
U.S. judges have not been interested in serving for what is, in essence,
almost pro-bono work.
Conflict of interest issues are very real and need to be overcome. There
has been a vast improvement of the rules of the various NAFTA secretariats in all three countries in spelling out precisely how disclosures
of interest should be made and dealt with. The parties have been extremely
vigilant in that regard; there have been panelists who have withdrawn
from panels or even been removed when a conflict of interest became
apparent. That is an important issue for the credibility of the panel
process that cannot be understated. Unfortunately, in one of the most
high profile cases, the appearance of conflict arose.3 4 Further, it arose
after one of the parties lost the case. That issue went to the Extraordinary
Challenge Committee which found that no confict of interest arose.35

34. In Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Pork from Canada, USITC Pub. No. 2362, Inv. 701-TA-298
at 19 (Feb. 1991), a binational panel remanded an administrative determination of the USITC twice.
In the subsequent extraordinary challenge under NAFTA art. 1904, the challenge was dismissed.
Memorandum Opinion and Order Regarding Binational Remand Decision II, Article 1904.13 Extraordinary No. ECC-91-1904-01 USA (June 14, 1991).
35. NAFTA art. 1904 provides for safeguarding the panel review system by providing for the
establishment of extraordinary challenge committees composed of judges or former judges to review
panel decisions in limited circumstances. Annex 1904.13 provides procedures for selecting the members
of the extraordinary challenge committees.
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Another question concerns the standard of review. It has tended to
arise in the larger, more politically charged cases. There have been about
70 panels since the beginning of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement.
Most of the decisions were unanimous or four-to-one decisions. Standard
of review has rarely been an issue. There were only three panel decisions
which resulted in an extraordinary challenge. In all three cases the issue
of the standard of review was raised and, in only one of the cases, was
there a split vote. Unfortunately, that case was decided along national
lines. Of the two
unanimous cases, both Canadian and U.S. participants
36
were involved.
I think the biggest problem in the context of Chapter 19 is one of
perception of what Chapter 19 is intended to be. There is a perception
that the Chapter 19 process is intended to be the same as the domestic
court process. It is not. It clearly was not negotiated that way. The
Chapter 19 process is a unique process. The panel process is in essence
an attempt to replicate, to some extent, the process of the Court of
International Trade or the federal court in Canada, but the extraordinary
challenge process is not intended to be a court of appeals. It is a much
more restrict ed process to determine whether there has been panel
misconduct which has materially affected the panel's decision and threatened the integrity of the binational review process. Many people have
suggested that the extraordinary challenge committee should serve in the
same manner as a court of appeals, and review the merits of the findings
of the panel. However, that was not what was negotiated. There are
large substantive differences between what a court of appeals can do and
what an extraordinary challenge committee can do.
There was debate as to whether Chapter 19 was temporary or permanent
in the context of the FTA. That ambiguity has been cleared up in the
context of NAFTA. It is clear that it is now a permanent system.
There is a certain amount of discontent by people who lose. Whether
that is legitimate or not is open to debate. From a Canadian perspective,
Chapter 19 is a very important aspect of NAFTA because NAFTA does
not contain specific obligations in the area of trade remedies. It is a
second-best solution. The Canadian government would rather have adopted
new trade remedy obligations, but the United States did not agree to
this in the negotiations.
QUESTIONS AND COMMENTS
John Rogers, Carlsmith Ball Wichman Murray Case Mukai & Ichiki,
Mexico City: I wonder if the panelists could say something about the
methodology of making determinations in dumping cases. Is it a simple
comparison of price at which the product is sold in one country versus
price at which the product is sold in another country without taking

36. For discussion of the experience of binational panels under the FTA, see Moyer, Chapter
19 of the NAFTA: binational panels as the trade courts of last resort, 27 INT'L LAW. 707 (1993).
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account of conditions and differences in the two countries? It could be
argued that in Mexico there is a lesser degree of risk of product liability
claims. Arguably a producer could take that into account in pricing
products sold in Mexico. Is that something that has ever been considered?
Stewart: There are many circumstances of sale adjustments that are
made. The process of price comparison can start from a simple premise
that one looks at the price FOB3 7 port of export or from the factory
gate and compares that price with the price of first sale by the producer
in the other country. But the reality in most cases is that there will be
claims for virtually every imaginable type of difference. I cannot say I
have been involved in a case where a claim has been made for differences
based on product liability, although differences are recognized based on
warranty costs. Such differences are fairly routine in cases where warranty
costs are large enough to be separately tracked and modified. Most of
the costs which might be called costs arising from the societal underpinning
are not going to be recognized.
Rogers: There are some differences that are very concrete, like taxes.
Mexico has a 15% value added tax (VAT).
Stewart: The VAT is not typically an issue in the cases. People in
countries which use the VAT as opposed to income tax get the break
that VAT under the GATT is netted out on export;3" this is not viewed
as a subsidy. Under the latest permutation of U.S. law in determining
the "home market price" of a product being exported to the United
States, a large VAT on a home market sale is no longer added. Earlier,
there was a series of cases in the United States where the VAT that
would have been imposed on a domestic sale was added to the "home
market price" even though it was not actually imposed on the exported
product.19

Applebaum: There is an effort in the antidumping statute to take into
account all demonstrable differences between costs in the two markets.
One cannot just claim the cost of doing business is higher; one must be
able to show those cost differences were actually incurred during the
investigation period with respect to the product in question. Warranty
cost differences are clearly recognized upon a showing that as between
one market and the other it was higher in one. Product liability insurance
costs or actual product liability claims would potentially be eligible for
adjustment. The Commerce Department takes a sort of "snapshot," a
picture of a six-month period or one-year period depending on the case,
to determine what costs were incurred during that period with respect

37. Free on Board (used when delivery by the seller is to continue until the goods are placed
over the ship's rail). See INT'L CHAMBER OF COM., INGcOTERMS 1990 (1990).

38. GATT netting rules: WTO Agreement, supra note 3, at art. 1.1 (a)(I)(ii) n.l:
In accordance with the provisions of Article XVI of GATT 1994 (Note to Article XVI) and the
provisions of Annexes I through III of this Agreement, the exemption of an exported product from
duties or taxes borne by the like product when destined for domestic consumption, or the remissions
of such duties or taxes in amounts not in excess of those which have accrued, shall not be deemed
to be a subsidy.
39.
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to the product in question. Differences in circumstances of sale are
recognized. In theory, the Commerce Department and the courts have
for years tried to make comparable, "apples-to-apples" comparisons by
requiring the products stripped down to FOB port or FOB factory netback,
taking out all costs.
Rogers: Is the Mexican approach the same?
Castafieda: In Mexico, the written law is more general. One big box
engulfs everything; it is called "general expenditures." In the case of
anti-dumping, the law is rather clear. You can throw in not only the
production costs but general expenditures and what is called a reasonable
margin of profit. What is that? It is like comparing apples and oranges.
That is one of the main weaknesses of the system itself. NAFTA should
be a great achieve ment in terms of unifying criteria for comparison of
costs and value but I am afraid to say that, even in the United States

and Canada, this is still a theoretical and practical problem.
Applebaum: Other differentials including credit differentials, technical
differences, and advertising differences, are taken into account, but these
have to be directly related to the product under investigation. Those
factors are fairly common in consumer product cases. The difficulty
always is in demonstrating those costs and their relationship to the product
under investigation.
Rogers: Another example would be the Japanese consumer who is far
more choosy in taking an automobile and often rejects it because the
finish is not good. If you simply introduce market studies that show
Japanese consumers are fussier, and translate this into a cost analysis
that shows 1007o of the cars were rejected and had to be refinished,
would that additional cost factor be considered?
Stewart: It depends on the fact situation. My experience in Mexico in
terms of the questionnaires and decisions that have come down reflect
similar types of adjustments. That is mostly true in all of the systems
that we have had experience with. There are differences in transparency
and in evidentiary burdens. But circumstance of sale adjustments are
required adjustments for all countries which are members of the WTO
system.
Applebaum: In order to compare the price in Japan to the price in
the United States, some adjustment must be made for the differences.
The burden would be on the Japanese seller of automobiles to demonstrate
the actual cost differences reflected in physical differences between the
automobile models sold in Japan and those sold for export. One cannot
simply come forward with a market study and say consumers in Japan
demand a different model. A showing must be made of the production
cost differences, whether they are higher or lower, for those features
which differentiate the Japanese home market model from the model
sold in the United States.
Gero: All the anti-dumping laws tend to be the same in all three
countries. But there is a great deal of minutiae and each side is attempting
to interpret what is available in its own favorable light. That is why
these cases become very difficult, very litigious.
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Rogers: Have you detected from your perspective a difference in approach between Canada and the U.S. in interpreting the data?
Gero: No, I think there is little difference between the way the U.S.
Department of Commerce would interpret the data and the way Revenue
Canada would.
Boris Kozolchyk, National Law Center, Tucson, Arizona: A professor
of law at the University of Arizona, David Ganz, was one of the judges
on the steel panel. He was trained in the civil law in Costa Rica and,
in fact, taught at the University of Costa Rica. David told me the thing
that delayed panel's procedures the most was the lack of translations.
The pleadings or whatever have to be translated into the three languages.
An enormous amount of time was spent. In fact some of our Center
people had to translate for all the sides.
Allan Van Fleet, Vinson & Elkins, Houston, Texas: Among the things
that go into the calculation of price in anti-dumping cases is a reasonable
return or a reasonable profit. I think it becomes quite fundamental when,
in determining what is a defensible low price, you have to include the
cost of capital. How do the officials deal with this cross-border? What
is the reasonable profit in Mexico when you can put your money in a
CD and gain 10007o interest?
Gero: In the past, the United States said it was 8% across the board,
period, and that is what would happen. That was not the case in Canadian
law. One tended to look at the companies' financial statements and try
to gather in a specified period of time, what the actual profits were. I
think the U.S. law subsequently has been changed to reflect the new
WTO agreements. The focus is now on actual profits. There have been
very significant changes in how profits are calculated.
Applebaum: In fact, the majority of anti-dumping cases do not involve
calculations of profits. In the garden variety case, the price in the United
States is compared to the price in the foreign markets, and there is no
reference to costs. Thus, as long as the price in the home market is
higher, there can be a finding of dumping even if sales in both markets
are profitable. The calculation of costs comes into play when for one
of several reasons under the statute there must be developed a surrogate
for the foreign market price. That surrogate is called "constructed value."
Until the Uruguay Round Agreement, the United States law for purposes
of calculating constructed value (the surrogate for the home market price)
had a statutory minimum of 8% for profit and 10% for general and
administrative costs. In fact, the United States generally applied the
by the United
statutory 8% minimum for profits. 40 That was 4eliminated
1
States in the Uruguay Round Agreements Act.
Stewart: The statutory minimums in the United States go back to about
1920; 42 they were often advantageous to respondents. Any time profits

40. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(e)(1)(B) (1988).
41. Final Act, supra note 3.
42. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(e)(1)(B) (1988).
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and G&A costs4 3 were higher than the 8% and 10% minimums, they
were never reported because they were simply unavailable. The agency
just plugged in the minimum costs. There certainly were cases where the
actual profits and costs were higher, so it was the type of procedure
that could cut both ways. Note that this problem generally arises only
in cases where the U.S. agency must determine the "constructed value"
of a product in the foreign home market. It is one of those changes
made at the insistence of respondents and it is likely that there will be
requests to return to the good old days, because the amount of information
that is required to satisfy the WTO alternative is very clearly not going
to be advantageous to many respondents.
Castafheda: Eight percent is merely a reference point to work with.
There is always an arbitrary side to any such system. This is one of the
main criticisM$ of
...
Olet.
Hopefully, the rules wil become more
precise, such as the rules addressing antitrust within the NAFTA area.
This would make the anti-dumping system a more objective system, where
8076 might be considered an overall average profit acceptable for Canadian,
U.S., and Mexican producers and traders.
Jimmie V. Reyna, Stewart & Stewart, Washington, D.C.: First a comment, then a question. I'm currently sitting on a binational panel that
is reviewing a Mexican resolution on chemicals. Although I don't have
formal training in civil law, I probably have more than a basic understanding of it, and I don't feel like I'm lacking. There are two reasons
for that. First, I have the opportunity to retain an assistant, meaning a
Mexican attorney, who is paid to help me whenever I encounter a problem.
Second, I have my Mexican colleagues who are panel members, and I
think that if a fine issue came up that required additional research or
that was a sticking point, they would certainly bring up that problem
and I could get my assistant to review it, if necessary. I don't think
that has ever been a problem. When you review the first decision that
was issued by the Mexican bi-national panel on steel, it is a well-reasoned,
well-written report. I did not see anything in it that told me the American
panel was remiss or that they didn't understand what they were doing.
To the contrary, it seemed like the process worked fairly well.
My question goes back to the discussions regarding the interplay of
antitrust and trade laws. Is there a basis for the U.S. government or
U.S. producers to obtain a remedy under U.S. antitrust laws? What
about the reverse of the hypothetical facts, that is, the Mexican producer
is selling its products in the United states 20% below cost and is receiving
tax and farm support subsidies from the Mexican government?
Applebaum: There are not enough facts on the pricing side, but one
must remember the requirements for predatory pricing under the Robinson-Patman Act" or the Sherman Act. 4- It is unclear whether there is
43. General and administrative expenses (also referred to as SG&A-selling,
minstrative expenses).
44. 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13b (1994)
45. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1994)

general and ad-
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price predatory discrimination, that is, whether the Mexican supplier is
selling below average variable cost and has the ability to recoup his
losses. In the absence of unusual additional facts, I would be very surprised
if there was any basis for a Sherman Act or Robinson-Patman case based
on sales by the Mexican seller.
The second half of the question about subsidies is particularly interesting. There is no simple way that I know to use the U.S. antitrust
laws to challenge governmental subsidies. In fact, if predatory pricing
principles are applied, it is almost certain that the foreign seller is not
selling below any measure of cost under U.S. antitrust laws because of
the subsidies. The U.S. antitrust laws would thus not likely provide a
remedy against either the low prices or the Mexican government subsidies.
The discussion of replacing the anti-dumping law with antitrust laws begs
the question of the countervailing duty law. In the NAFTA context the
two have always been considered in tandem. While the anti-dumping law
is the more controversial in terms of overall U.S. trade, the countervailing
duty law is more controversial with respect to Canada and perhaps will
eventually be with respect to Mexico.
Stewart: The procedures in anti-dumping46 and countervailing duty 47
(subsidy) cases are very similar, but they are two totally different instruments that are intended to address two different problems. It is clear
that in making progress on countervailing duties, one would have to
make progress on subsidies disciplines. If no progress is made on subsidies
disciplines, one cannot possibly talk about eliminating countervailing duties
because a basic imbalance is created. The proposals to replace trade
remedies with antitrust law suggest replacing only anti-dumping law.
The question whether it would be sufficient to prohibit predatory pricing
without anti-dumping laws in a free trade area becomes whether a seller
could maintain a 20% price difference in a truly free market. If the
seller is not engaged in predatory pricing and there is arbitrage, would
the seller be able to maintain this price difference for any reasonable
length of time? How do we deal with a 2007o price difference between
New York and Los Angeles, to the extent that this is not accounted for
by freight and other transportation costs? If there is a significant and
artificial price difference in a free trade area, and there are no barriers
at the border, then arbitrage will set in very rapidly and the seller's
ability to maintain that 2007o price difference will be very limited.

46. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673-1673h (1994) (antidumping law).
47. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671-1671h (1994) (countervailing duty law).

